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The Singapore state has a secular constitution and a population of mixed 
ethnicity and religion. Ethnically, Singapore society has for the past three decades 
contained a relatively stable population mix of some 75 percent Chinese, 15 percent 
Malay and 7 percent Indian. Religious adherence only partly coincides with ethnic 
group membership: thus while a large majority of Muslims are of Malay origin, 
there is a significant minority of Indians among them; Hinduism entirely comprises 
Indians, while Buddhism and Taoism are almost exclusively Chinese. Christianity, 
both Catholic and Protestant, is predominantly Chinese in membership, with a 
significant Indian minority. · 
In the 1950s and 60s a combination of religious and ethnic cleavages, sometimes 
fuelled by anti-colonial sentiment, resulted in episodes of public disorder and fatal 
confrontation. Two of the more notable incidents were the Maria Hertogh riots of 
1950 after a Eurasian girl who had been raised as a Muslim was returned to her 
Roman Catholic Dutch father by a court order; and communal clashes in 1964 between 
Malays and Chinese during a religious procession on the anniversary of the prophet 
Mohammed. Such incidents are regularly highlighted by government and media to 
demonstrate the inherent fragility of Singapore's ethnic and religious pluralism. 
Singapore achieved self-rule in 1959, independence as part of a federal Malaysia 
in 1963, and sole independence after an abrupt split with Malaysia in 1965: this was 
followed early in 1968 by the British decision to withdraw its troops. Since the 
political leadership of Singapore did not believe the country could survive on its 
own (Lee Kuan Yew, for instance, believed that 'island nations are political jokes') 
this experience was traumatic and, once again, has become part of the republic's 
myth of origin. The key phrases of the early period of independence were the 'politics 
of survival', building a 'rugged society', and adopting an 'ideology of pragmatism'. 
To use the analogy.of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, until the mid 1970s the 
overwhelming imperative was to secure an economic base through rapid 
industrialisation and to provide an infrastructure, especially of housing and education, 
which would attract overseas capital and enhance the government's legitimacy. 
Nothing was heard of 'Asian values' or Confucianism as a source of social discipline, 
and when commenting on the existence of putative 'core values' in 1972 a leading 
member of the government, Goh Keng Swee, said: 'If we are honest with ourselves, 
I think we can detect in contemporary Singapore a strange but striking similarity of 
intellectual climate with Victorian England, together with much of the hypocrisies 
30 Australian Religion Studies Review 
and cruelties of that age'. Any articulation of cultural values took the form of a 
negative critique of Western decadence, epitomised in the figure of the "hippie". 
Two influential developments pushed the issue of social values, and with them 
the question of the religious factor, to the fore. First, Western depictions of the impact 
which religious ideology could have on development in East and Southeast Asia -
which really began with Bellah's work in the 1950s and 1960s on religion in Japan 
and more generally in Asia - were taken up in local academic discussions of identity 
and 'Asian values' from 1973 onwards: these were usually framed in terms of national 
cultural identity. But even as late as 1977, at a seminar on Asian Values and 
Modernisation, another leading government minister, Rajaratnam, expressed 
scepticism: 'I have very serious doubts as to whether such a thing as 'Asian values' 
really exists- or for that matter 'Asian' anything ... ' He preferred to characterise the 
prevailing Singaporean value as that of 'moneytheism'. 
The second influence is very much in line with the Maslow analogy. By the 
late 1970s most of the basic needs of the population had been fulfilled, but there was 
growing concern about a range of perceived social problems. These included a greater 
visibility of crime, delinquency and drug-use, together with what were seen to be 
rising levels of divorce and abortion; and although in comparative terms these rates 
may have been relatively low, they provoked concern about the moral dimension of 
nation-building. The potential of rapid development to bring about a deculturalisation 
of Singapore citizens was a closely related theme, leading to a call for more 'cultural 
ballast' to prevent this. Commencing in 1979 these non-material, cultural aspects of 
society were addressed, and it is at this point that the project to conscript religion 
into the inculcation of civic virtue emerged. 
In 1979 two reports on education were produced. The first, under the 
chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education Goh Keng Swee 
(whose earlier sceptical remarks on core values have been noted) was principally 
concerned with bilingualism. Coupled with its recommendations on language 
streaming, however, were clear indicators of a broader concern to avert 
deculturalisation by teaching Asian history and moral values in the language of the 
three main cultures - Chinese, Malay, and Indian. In his comment on the Report, 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew emphasised the characteristics of the good citizen-
patriotism, filial respect, responsibility, tolerance, and punctuality - and went on to 
show how these could be inculcated through religion: 
The best of the East and West must be blended to advantage in the Singaporean. 
Confucianist ethics, Malay traditions, and the Hindu ethos must be combined 
with sceptical Western methods of scientific inquiry, the open discursive methods 
in the search for truth. We have to discard obscurantist and superstitious beliefs 
of the East, as we have to reject the passing fads of the West. 
The second report (the Ong Report) was more specifically on moral education 
and addressed the perceived deficiencies of the existing Civics program. It also 
Volume 10, Number 2 31 
pointed out that many of the teachers in mission schools - some of the highest quality 
private schools in Singapore- had strong religious backgrounds, which aided their 
teaching of Civics. It recommended the introduction of a 'Moral Education' program, 
the object of which should be to produce 'good, useful and loyal citizens through 
inculcation of the desired moral values and social attitudes'. To prevent 
deculturalisation, emphasis 'should be placed on inculcating the desired Eastern 
and Asian moral concepts, values and attitudes so as to help in the preservation and 
strengthening of our cultural heritage'. Responding to this report, Goh advocated a 
holistic approach and, noting that there was nobody in the Ministry of Education 
with sufficient grasp of such issues, he recommended the outside help of a prominent 
local Jesuit. Thus was religion initially conscripted into the moral education program, 
but the comment of a prominent educationalist at the time highlights the essentially 
instrumental nature of the project: 
There would be a broad agreement in Singapore with the Durkheimian view 
that the schools are the guardians of national character, to be used for the 
inculcation of common moral sentiments on the basis of a secular rather than a 
religious inspired morality. 
Work rapidly began on the development of a moral education syllabus - a 
major policy change for a previously secular government - and early in 1982 it was 
announced that five religious subjects would be offered- Bible knowledge, Buddhist 
studies, Hindu studies, Islamic religious knowledge, and World religions. They would 
be taught cognitively as classroom subjects, 'like studying Shakespeare'. Goh had 
not originally envisaged the inclusion of Confucianism, which he saw as a secular 
ethical system, but on the urging of the Prime Minister and after 'several sleepless 
nights' he announced the inclusion of Confucian Ethics in the syllabus. Very soon 
this part of the project attracted a disproportionate share of the resources devoted to 
the overall program; but it is worth noting as a background to the development that 
it was in the decade of the 1980s that a succession of Western social scientists and 
political commentators pointed to Confucianism as a major contributor to the rapid 
development of East Asian societies. What eventuated, in effect, was a form of reverse 
Orientalism: instead of the static, tradition-bound 'magic gardens' found in Weber's 
portrayal of Eastern religions, there was substituted the vigorous, socially disciplined 
ethos of neoConfucianism which could now challenge Western values. 
There are strong components of Weber in the approach to religion adopted in 
developing the various curricula. Tong Chee Kiang has noted the 'rationalisation of 
religion' that has occurred in Singapore, by which he means the filtering out of folk 
beliefs and the domestication or 'tidying up' of less manageable elements - a 
movement from more ritually based to more canonical forms of religion. In the case 
of Confucianism this entailed the importing of Confucian scholars from the United 
States and Taiwan to consult on the syllabus: as commentators have noted, 
Confucianism was hardly discussed in Singapore until the late 1970s. Buddhism 
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proved somewhat more difficult to codify because formal religious instruction was 
unfamiliar to local Buddhist monks: after the Singapore Buddhist Foundation 
commissioned a prominent Sinhalese scholar-monk to write a textbook, the latter 
was judged unsuitable because it lacked practical orientation. The task was entrusted 
to the Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore, which established its own 
team to write the material and only consulted the Buddhist Federation when there 
were queries over scriptural interpretation. The resulting textbook treated the ritual 
aspects of Buddhism in a negative manner and concentrated on Buddhist teachings 
as translated into such values as self-reliance, tolerance, loving-kindness, and 
compassion. 
It will be clear from the above narrative that the conscription of the religious 
factor in the pursuit of a moral education program was inseparable from a process of 
containment. In order to be accommodated within the school syllabus, religion had 
to take a form that was acceptable to the state; and a process of homogenisation 
occurred whereby interreligious differences were permissible so long as they 
complemented one another. The syllabus was introduced in 1984 and in less than 
two years a series of events which demonstrated the unintended consequences of 
religion had been set in motion which indirectly led to the eventual discarding of the 
syllabus in 1989. 
The problematic nature of religion was first accented in late 1986 and early 
1987 in relation to Malay Singaporeans and their Islamic identity. In 1986 the 
Singapore President invited the President of Israel to visit the country, an act that 
was widely interpreted among Singapore's Islamic neighbours as evidence of the 
republic's hubris. The modernising elites in both Malaysia and Indonesia have fought 
a constant rearguard action against resurgent Islam and in Malaysia Prime Minister 
Mahathir had adopted an anti-Zionist, even an anti-Jewish stance. What was seen 
as a personal slight to Mahathir, coupled with a more general resentment in Malaysia 
of Singapore's economic success, led to a deeply hostile response in the Malaysian 
media, including suggestions that Singapore's fresh water supplies piped across the 
Johore causeway should be cut off; and that the air services agreement between the 
two countries should be revoked. The Singapore government ensured that the local 
media reported these reactions as a means of jolting the complacency of younger 
citizens who might be less persuaded of the potential precariousness of the island 
state. Eventually the furore was restrained, but almost immediately it was revived in 
a speech by Minister Lee Hsien Loong who explained why there were no Malay 1 
pilots in the Singapore Armed Forces: 
If there is a conflict, if the SAF is called upon to defend the homeland, we don't 
want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his emotions for the 
nation may come into conflict with his emotions for his religion, because these 
are two very strong fundamentals, and if they are not compatible, then they will 
be two very strong destructive forces in opposite directions. 
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This again attracted much adverse comment in Malaysia, with imputations of 
chauvinism among the government leadership. A third incident in June 1987, when 
four Malays with Islamic links were arrested for allegedly spreading rumours of 
impending racial clashes, further underlined the potentially divisive fusion of ethnicity 
and religion. This was amplified by the Straits Times into a reminder of previous 
incidents of ethnic-religious violence, including the Maria Hertogh riots of 1950. 
In July 1987 religion was once again implicated in potential subversion when 
sixteen Roman Catholic social activists were arrested and interned by the Internal 
Security Department in what came to be officially labelled a 'Marxist Conspiracy'. 
The mastermind of this conspiracy was claimed to be Tan Wah Pi ow, a former student 
activist who had fled Singapore in 1976 after being convicted and sentenced to one 
year's jail for unlawful assembly and rioting. An icon of Tan appeared at the head of 
the newspaper account, and was to reappear in subsequent newspaper reporting of 
proceedings. The Home Affairs Ministry report of the investigation contained a 
diagram showing an alleged network of conspirators (reminiscent of those used 
during the 1950s struggle with the Communist Party of Malaysia). Organisations 
implicated in the report included the Student Christian Movement of Singapore, the 
Young Christian Workers' Movement, the National University of Singapore Catholic 
Students' Society, Singapore Polytechnic Catholic Students' Society, the Justice and 
Peace Commission of the Catholic Church, and a Catholic Welfare Centre whose 
main activity was to run a refuge for Filipino maids. The report also placed 
considerable emphasis on the fact that the majority of those arrested were graduates 
and professionals. The moral panic thus created was expanded into a major exposition 
of the alleged threat from subversive communism 1• It was followed by a robust critique 
of 'liberation theology' by Rajaratnam, who described its proponents as 'Leninists 
wearing white collars the wrong way round'. 
The 'Marxist Conspiracy' and its aftermath rumbled on through the latter 
part of 1987, once again highlighting the unpredictable dimension of religion, but 
as the controversy subsided a more diffuse concern about the influence of religion, 
and specifically about the impact of the religious education syllabus, began to be 
articulated. From the initial introduction of the Religious Knowledge program there 
had been explicit recognition of the potential problem of conversion inside and outside 
the classroom, and this became a major preoccupation of government in the late 
1980s. This had been a recurring motif as far back as 1950 with the Maria Hertogh 
case, and it had resurfaced in 1965 when Muslims complained about proselytising 
by Christians, leading to the latter publicly denying any such intention. In 1987-88, 
the problem appeared to be a dramatic shift among young, English-educated Chinese 
towards the rapidly growing Christian charismatic churches, with the possibly 
destabilising effect of inter-ethnic conversions which this might encourage. Although 
the figures subsequently turned out to have been somewhat inflated, they were 
sufficiently dramatic to attract government attention: at this point we can observe a 
series of initiatives leading to the formal containment of religion by means of 
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legislation. 
The government commissioned a series of reports by sociologists at theN ational 
University of Singapore into the current religious situation, and especially into patterns 
of conversion. One of the concerns behind the commissioning of the reports -
articulated by Lee Kuan Yew in his 1987 National Day speech after reading 
Kornhauser on Mass Society- was that the pace of social change in Singapore had 
outstripped the capacity of many people to make sense of their new surroundings; 
and the perceived problem was operationalised around Durkheim's concept of anomie; 
The Reports' findings confirmed that there had been growth among Christian 
charismatic churches in Singapore, that conversion was disproportionately 
concentrated among those who were young (14-19 being the key age group), of 
higher status, and English-educated; but anomie was not found to be an important 
factor in conversion to Christianity. The reports were covered in considerable detail 
in the media and their implications were widely canvassed. 
In 1989 the Religious Knowledge program was scrapped for several reasons. 
First, there was concern that as a result of a curriculum which emphasised the 
uniqueness of each religious tradition rather than one emphasising comparative 
world religions there had been the unintended consequence of increasing students' 
religious fervour. Second, the combination of a course in Confucian Ethics and a 
simultaneous campaign to 'speak Mandarin' was thought to have the unintended 
consequence of increasing insecurity among the non-Chinese population and inflating 
the sense of uniqueness of Chinese Singaporeans vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. It 
should be recalled that the 1980s saw a steady traffic of Western social scientists 
through the East and Southeast Asian region preaching the merits of the Confucian 
ethic, and these received considerable local publicity. However, there is a certain 
irony in these concerns: as a Religious Knowledge option, Confucianism had in fact 
been losing out to Buddhist Studies and Bible Knowledge because in a keenly 
competitive education system Confucianism was thought by students to be more 
difficult to learn and therefore a distraction from more 'serious' subjects: in 1989 
the percentage of Secondary Three students who enrolled in Buddhist Studies was 
44 percent, while the Confucian Ethics option attracted only 18 percent. Buddhism 
- in its rationalised form - could also be seen as an attractive option to those wanting 
to be both Chinese and modem, and support for this view is provided by the success 
of canonical forms of Buddhism such as Soka Gakkai in the wider population. 
Furthermore, the conversion of significant numbers of English-speaking Chinese to 
Christianity takes place in young adolescence so that Bible Knowledge would be 
seen as more relevant by them. Thus behind the official reasons for curtailing the 
program, there are additional factors which explain its demise. 
At the same time, policies were being formulated which would secure the 
further containment of religion. Beginning in mid 1989 the government intimated 
that in view of the disruptive potential of religion - both ethnically and politically -
which had been revealed since the mid-1980s, formal initiatives might be required 
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to control religious activities. In April 1989 Minister Lee Hsien Loong mooted the 
possibility of legislation to preserve religious harmony and shortly afterwards it was 
reported that several religious leaders were in favour of laws to protect such harmony: 
one important function of the Singapore media is to report consensus in relation to 
major policy issues. 
The sequence of events leading to the passing of what became the Maintenance 
of Religious Harmony Act can be summarised briefly. In late December, 1989, a 
White Paper on Religious Harmony was released. The Internal Security Department 
had compiled a report - which was annexed to the White Paper - illustrating the 
problems caused by over-zealousness in religion. In response to the White Paper's 
stated intention to demarcate between religious and political activity, the Catholic 
Archbishop and the Mufti called for a clearer definition of. 'politics', though there 
was also evidence provided in the media of broad acceptance by religious leaders of 
the need for legislation. 
The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill was first introduced on January 
16, 1990, and it later became clear that Christian groups would express their 
reservations to the Select Committee. During the debate on the Second Reading of 
the Bill Prime Minister Goh explained that its origins lay in a 1986 report from the 
Internal Security Department about aggressive proselytism by some religious groups, 
and there followed a substantial debate on the perceived twin problems of conversion 
and subversion. During Select Committee hearings in September 1990, two points 
were constantly reiterated: the first was the need for legislation to prevent the kind 
of riots and public disturbances which had occurred in the past (again, the Maria 
Hertogh case was especially emphasised); but second, it was stressed that the Bill 
incorporated less severe penalties than the use of criminal law, since it contained the 
provision that the first response to an alleged infringement was cautionary rather 
than punitive. The Bill was finally passed into law as the Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony Act in November, 1990, and the legal containment of religion was 
accomplished. 
It is clear that by 1988 the Singapore government had been sufficiently 
persuaded of the potentially destabilising effects of religious revivalism and activism; 
and the likely divisive impact of religion and ethnicity in combination had resurfaced. 
Thus in an overlapping chronology of policy development from 1988 onwards, 
there was a search for an alternative 'civil religion' -one more in line with Rousseau's 
minimalist prescription - in the form of a national ideology with a more secular 
articulation. At its core was an identical concern to that of the Confucian project - to 
instill social virtues in the face of their erosion by Western values, or as Minister 
Goh had put it in 1988, 'If individualism results in creativity, that is good, but if it 
translates into a 'me first' attitude, that is bad for social cohesion and for the country'. 
The precedents of neighbouring countries, Indonesia with its Pancasila and Malaysia 
with its Rukunegara, were an explicit feature of what came to be identified as the 
'Shared Values' project from the outset. Once again a National University team, 
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based at the Institute for Policy Studies, was convened to provide background research 
and the findings were presented in 1990. After some debate over the precise number 
of values and the wording of the text the government in 1991 presented its White 
Paper on Shared Values, containing five principles: 1) Nation before community 
and society above self; 2) Family as the basic unit of society; 3) Regard and community 
support for the individual; 4) Consensus instead of contention; and 5) Racial and 
religious harmony. While various interpretation have been made of the intentions 
behind the ruling party's support for this project, it is notable that it was initiated at 
a time of ideological contention and immediately before a change in political 
leadership. 
As the 1990s have seen a period of greater consolidation in the government's 
leadership combined with some selective opening up of social space, there has been 
less urgency in the search for such ideological formulations, and the White Paper 
has been allowed to lie quietly on the table. In its place in 1994 was introduced a set 
of Family Values which are more finely focused and which, after some debate, were 
promoted as: love, care and concern; mutual respect; commitment; filial responsibility 
(in the original draft 'piety'); and communication. Though there are echoes of the 
Confucian project, the epithet 'piety' was rejected precisely because it had religious 
connotations. In fact the values correspond closely with public policy towards care 
for the aged (seen as a primary responsibility of children) and can be seen as an 
attempt by the state to enlist the family as a central mediator of moral values. Whether 
this will be more successful than previous attempts to inculcate civic virtue is 
questionable. 
It is useful to introduce Weber once again by way of conclusion. Reviewed in 
this article are some of the policy initiatives towards religion which have been deployed 
by a state which has been characterised by a high level of technical rationality. 
Within the parameters of certain key principles - multiracialism, multilingualism, 
and meritocracy - there is a fundamental pragmatism in decision-making which 
facilitates apparent policy reversals or major realignments when these are found to 
contain unintended consequences of a negative kind. Elsewhere I and my co-author 
have labelled this a 'Return to Sender' process, as the state responds to unintended 
consequences and missed cues on the part of its citizenry2, and the policy shift from 
conscription to containment of religion provides an excellent example of the process 
in Singapore. Underlying such pragmatism there lies a firm consistency, and this is 
the principle that Weber attached to all systems of technical rationality, namely the 
existence of 'spheres of competence'- the strictly demarcated and specialised functions 
which each component preserves within the whole. It is a principle which has been 
unwaveringly maintained in Singapore, especially in the area of public life where 
conflicts of interest may prove highly corrosive. In Singapore it has been clearly 
asserted in disputes over academic freedom, and the containment of religion is simply 
one further application of the principle. (It is also one reason why a number of 
religious organisations in Singapore have become detached from international or 
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regional associations - but that is another theme). Indeed, the logic on which the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act is based had already been propounded by 
Lee Kuan Yew in the early 1970s: 
We can maintain this spirit of tolerance provided religious and secular leaders 
do not commit the tragic error of dragging religion into the political arena or 
using it as a cloak for political ambitions. 
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1. A useful account of these events can be found in Lee Lai To (1988) 'Singapore in 1987: 
Setting a New Agenda' Asian Survey 28, 2: 242-253. 
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